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Abstract
Given a propositional theory T and a proposition q, a sufficient condition of q is one that will make
q true under T , and a necessary condition of q is one that has to be true for q to be true under T . In this
paper, we propose a notion of strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions. Intuitively, the
strongest necessary condition of a proposition is the most general consequence that we can deduce
from the proposition under the given theory, and the weakest sufficient condition is the most general
abduction that we can make from the proposition under the given theory. We show that these two
conditions are dual ones, and can be naturally extended to arbitrary formulas. We investigate some
computational properties of these two conditions and discuss some of their potential applications.
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1. Introduction
Given a propositional theory T and a proposition q , a sufficient condition α of q is one
that will make q true under T : T |= α ⊃ q . Symmetrically, a necessary condition α of q is
one that has to be true for q to be true under T : T |= q ⊃ α.
For instance, consider the following theory T :
rain⊃ grassWet,
sprinklerOn⊃ grassWet.
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A sufficient condition for grassWet to be true under T is for rain to be true. Another
(trivial) one is grassWet itself. Yet another one is sprinklerOn. And yet another one is
rain∨ sprinklerOn.
In this paper we shall propose a notion of weakest sufficient and strongest necessary
conditions, study their properties, and consider ways of computing them. There are many
potential applications. The following are two examples:
• Abduction. As we can see from the above example, given an observation, there may
be more than one abductive conclusions that we can draw. It should be useful to find
the weakest of such conclusions, i.e., the weakest sufficient condition of the observa-
tion.
• Definability. It is often necessary to determine whether a given theory yields a de-
finition of a proposition in terms of a set of other propositions. For example, such
computation is essential in both Simon’s [21] and Pearl’s [15] approaches to cau-
sation. This is also what is needed in order to compute successor state axioms [18]
from causal theories. As we shall see, the problem of whether a proposition can be
defined in terms of other propositions, and if so, finding an explicit definition of this
proposition can be reduced to that of computing the two conditions that we shall pro-
pose in this paper. Furthermore, we believe definability is best handled using these
two conditions. While a proposition may or may not be definable in terms of a set
of base propositions, our strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions, as
we shall show, always exist and are unique up to logical equivalence under the given
theory. Furthermore, these two conditions are useful to have even when a proposi-
tion cannot be defined in terms of others. For instance, in the context of reasoning
about actions, this situation arises when an action has an indeterminate effect on a
proposition. In this case, the strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions
of this proposition can be used to completely capture the effect of this action on the
proposition.
This paper is organized as follows. We include logical preliminaries in Section 2. In
Section 3, we define the notion of strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions,
and prove some results that characterize these conditions. In Section 4, we extend these
two conditions to that of arbitrary formulas. In Section 5 we outline some algorithms for
computing these two conditions and discuss some experimental results. In Section 6, we
discuss some related work, and finally in Section 7, we conclude this paper.
2. Logical preliminaries
We assume a propositional language. As usual, a truth assignment is a function from the
set of propositions in the language to {true, false}, and the satisfiability relation M |= ϕ is
defined as usual between a truth assignment M and a formula ϕ.
Given a set P of propositions, a formula that mentions only propositions in P is called
a formula of P . It is clear that the truth value of such a formula is determined by the truth
values of the propositions in P only.
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Given a formula ϕ, and a proposition p, we denote by ϕ(p/true) the result of replacing
every p in ϕ by true. We extend this notation to a set of formulas as well: if T is a finite
set of formulas, then by T (p/true) we mean the formula
∧
ϕ∈T
ϕ(p/true).
We define ϕ(p/false) and T (p/false) similarly. It is clear that for any truth assignment M ,
M |= ϕ(p/true) iff M ′ |= ϕ, where M ′ is the truth assignment that is exactly like M but
M ′(p)= true. A similar result holds for ϕ(p/false).
A notion of forgetting, or eliminations of “middle terms” as Boole [2, p. 99] called it,
will be essential here. Given a formula ϕ, and a proposition p, the result of forgetting p in
ϕ, written forget(ϕ;p), is the following formula:
ϕ(p/true)∨ ϕ(p/false).
Now given a finite set of propositions P , the result of forgetting P in ϕ, written
forget(ϕ;P), is defined inductively as:
forget(ϕ; ∅)= ϕ,
forget(ϕ;P ∪ {q})= forget(forget(ϕ;q);P).
It can be shown that for any formula ϕ and any propositions p1 and p2, forget(forget(ϕ;
p1);p2) and forget(forget(ϕ;p2);p1) are equivalent. So forget(ϕ;P) is well defined.
Since Boole [2] first defined it in 1854, this notion of forgetting, or eliminations of
middle terms, has been re-discovered several times. For instance, Weber [23] re-introduced
it and used it for updating propositional knowledge bases. It is also a special case of a more
general notion of forgetting defined on first-order languages by Lin and Reiter [13] for
capturing database progression [12] and certain notions of relevance in problem solving.
Lewis [9, p. 155] observed that “For purposes of application of the algebra 1 to ordinary
reasoning, elimination is a process more important than solution, since most processes
of reasoning take place through the elimination of ‘middle’ terms”. As we shall see, this
notion of “the elimination of middle terms” is certainly central for us here.
The following lemma is entailed by Proposition 3 in (Lin and Reiter [13]), and will play
an important role in this paper.
Lemma 1. For any formula ϕ and any set P of propositions, if φ does not mention any
propositions in P , then
ϕ |= φ⇔ forget(ϕ;P) |= φ.
In particular, we have that ϕ |= forget(ϕ;P).
1 The author’s note: “the algebra” = Boolean algebra as we know it today.
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3. Strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions
We begin with strongest necessary conditions. As we shall see, weakest sufficient
conditions are dual ones.
Definition 1. Let T be a theory, P a set of propositions in T , and q a proposition in T
but not in P . A formula ϕ of P is said to be a necessary condition of q on P under T if
T |= q ⊃ ϕ. It is said to be a strongest necessary condition if it is a necessary condition,
and for any other necessary condition ϕ′, we have that T |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′.
In this paper, both the background theory T and the base set P of propositions are
assumed to be finite. The following proposition is straightforward:
Proposition 1. If both ϕ and ϕ′ are strongest necessary conditions of q on P under T ,
then T |= ϕ ≡ ϕ′.
This means that if there is a strongest necessary condition, then it is unique up to logical
equivalence under the background theory. So sometimes, we also call a strongest necessary
condition the strongest one.
Example 1. The following examples provide some intuitions about our notion of strongest
necessary conditions.
(1) T1 = {q ⊃ (p1 ∧ p2)}. The strongest necessary condition of q on {p1,p2} under T1
is p1 ∧ p2, and the strongest necessary condition of q on {p1} is p1.
(2) T2 = {q ⊃ (p1∨p2)}. The strongest necessary condition of q on {p1,p2} is p1∨p2,
and the strongest necessary condition of q on {p1} is true because neither p1 nor
¬p1 follow from q under T2.
(3) T3 = {q ⊃ p1, q}. A strongest necessary condition of q on {p1} is p1. Another one
is true. Of course, T3 |= p1 ≡ true.
The following theorem captures this notion of strongest necessary conditions in terms
of truth assignments. It says that a necessary condition ϕ of q is a strongest one on P if
and only if for any model of T , if it satisfies ϕ, then it can be modified into a model of q
without changing the truth values of the propositions in P :
Theorem 1. Let T , P , and q be as in Definition 1. Let ϕ be a necessary condition of q
on P under T . Then ϕ is a strongest necessary condition of q on P under T iff for any
model M of T and ϕ, there is an assignment M ′ such that:
(1) for any p ∈ P , M ′(p)=M(p).
(2) M ′ |= T ∪ {q}.
Proof. The “if” part: suppose ϕ is the strongest necessary condition (SNC) of q , and
M |= T ∪{ϕ}. We need to show the existence of a modelM ′ that satisfies the two conditions
in the theorem. We prove by contradiction. Suppose there is no such M ′, i.e., there is no
model of T ∪ {q,M(P)}, where M(P) is the conjunction of p, if M(p) = true, or ¬p,
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if M(p) = false, for every p ∈ P . Then T |= q ⊃ ¬M(P). This means that ¬M(P) is
a necessary condition (NC) of q on P . Thus T |= ϕ ⊃ ¬M(P), this contradicts with the
assumption that M |= T ∪ {ϕ}.
The “only if” part: suppose for any model M of T and ϕ, there is another model M ′
that satisfies the two conditions in the theorem. We need to show that ϕ is the SNC of q .
Let ϕ′ be another NC of q : it is a formula of P and T |= q ⊃ ϕ′. We need to prove that
T |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′. Let M be any model of ϕ and T . We show that M is also a model of ϕ′. By our
assumption, there is another model M ′ that satisfies the two conditions in the theorem. This
means that M ′ |= q and M ′ |= T . So M ′ |= ϕ′. But M(P) =M ′(P ), and ϕ′ is a formula
of P . So we have M |= ϕ′ as well. ✷
Notice that it is essential that the formula ϕ in Theorem 1 be a necessary condition of q .
Otherwise, we could always let ϕ be false.
We can use this theorem to verify that a certain necessary condition is in fact the
strongest. For instance, consider T1 = {q ⊃ p1 ∧ p2} in Example 1 above. Clearly, p1
is a necessary condition of q on {p1}. It’s a strongest one because given any model of T1,
if it satisfies p1, then we can modify it into another model of T1 and q while preserving the
truth value of p1. However, although it is also a necessary condition of q on {p1,p2}, it is
not the strongest one this time, because if M |= p1 ∧ ¬p2 ∧ ¬q , then M |= T1 ∪ {p1},
but it cannot be modified into a model of q and T1 without changing the truth value
of p2.
We can similarly define the notion of weakest sufficient conditions:
Definition 2. Let T be a theory, P a set of propositions in T , and q a proposition in T
but not in P . A formula ψ of P is said to be a sufficient condition of q on P under T if
T |=ψ ⊃ q . It is said to be a weakest sufficient condition if it is a sufficient condition, and
for any other sufficient condition ψ ′, we have that T |=ψ ′ ⊃ψ .
Strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions are in fact dual conditions. The
easiest way to make this dual relationship precise is to extend these conditions from
propositions to arbitrary formulas and to show that for any formula A, a formula ϕ is
a strongest necessary (weakest sufficient) condition of A iff ¬ϕ is a weakest sufficient
(strongest necessary) condition of ¬A. This will be done in Section 4.
We now relate these two conditions to the notion of definability. We say that a theory T
defines a proposition q on a set P of propositions iff there is a formula ϕ of P such that
T |= q ≡ ϕ. The following proposition is straightforward:
Proposition 2. A theory T defines a proposition q on P iff T |= ϕ ⊃ φ, where ϕ is any
strongest necessary condition of q on P and φ any weakest sufficient condition of q on P ,
both under the theory T .
Given that ϕ is a strongest necessary condition and φ a weakest sufficient condition of q ,
when the condition T |= ϕ ⊃ φ holds, we have that T |= ϕ ≡ φ and T |= q ≡ ϕ. So this
proposition reduces the problem of computing definability to that of computing strongest
necessary and weakest sufficient conditions. An advantage of working with the latter is that
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the two conditions always exist and are unique up to logical equivalence under any given
theory. Furthermore, they are useful to have even when they do not yield a definition of a
proposition. For instance, in logic of programs, Dijkstra’s notion of weakest preconditions
is a special case of our notion of weakest sufficient conditions, and as shown in [1,6], these
conditions provide a good way to reason about the indeterminate effects of actions for
which successor state axioms (definitions) do not exist.
4. Strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions of a formula
Our notion of strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions can be extended
from a proposition to an arbitrary formula.
Definition 3. Let T be a propositional theory, α a formula, and P a set of propositions in
T ∪ {α}. A formula ϕ of P is said to be a necessary condition of α on P iff T |= α ⊃ ϕ.
It is said to be a strongest necessary condition if for any other necessary condition ϕ′, we
have that T |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′. Sufficient conditions and weakest sufficient conditions are defined
similarly.
Computing the strongest necessary and the weakest sufficient conditions of a formula
can be reduced to that of a proposition, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 3. Let T , P , and α be as in Definition 3. A formula ϕ of P is the strongest
necessary (weakest sufficient) condition of α on P under the theory T iff it is the strongest
necessary (weakest sufficient) condition of q on P under the theory T ′ = T ∪ {q ≡ α},
where q is a new proposition not in T and α.
Proof. We prove this for SNC. The case for WSC is similar. The “if” part: suppose ϕ is the
SNC of α. We show that it is also an SNC of q under T ′. It is easy to see that it is an NC of
q: T ′ |= q ⊃ ϕ. Let ϕ′ be any other necessary condition: T ′ |= q ⊃ ϕ′. Thus T ′ |= α ⊃ ϕ′.
Since q does not occur in α and ϕ′, by Lemma 1, we have that forget(T ′, q) |= α ⊃ ϕ′. But
forget(T ′, q) is equivalent to T since q does not occur in T and α. So ϕ′ is also a necessary
condition of α on P under T . Thus T |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′. So T ′ |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′.
The “only if” part: suppose ϕ is the SNC of q under T ′. First of all, it is an NC:
T ′ |= q ⊃ ϕ. Similar to the reasoning above, we have T |= α ⊃ ϕ. So ϕ is also an NC
of α on P under T . Now if ϕ′ is any other NC of α under T : T |= α ⊃ ϕ′. Then it is
also an NC of q under T ′. Thus by our assumption that ϕ is the SNC of q , we have that
T ′ |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′. Thus T |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′ since q does not occur in T . ✷
Although not necessary in principle, the notion of sufficient and necessary conditions of
a formula is very useful in expressing many properties. The following are some interesting
ones.
The first one says that, as expected, if two formulas are equivalent under T , then they
have the same strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions:
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Proposition 4. If T |= α ≡ β , then for any set of propositions P , a formula ϕ is a strongest
necessary (weakest sufficient) condition of α on P iff it is a strongest necessary (weakest
sufficient) condition of β on P .
Proof. Suppose ϕ is the SNC of α on P under T . Then it is NC of β as well. Now let ϕ′
be any SC of β : T |= β ⊃ ϕ′. Then we have T |= α ⊃ ϕ′, so T |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′. Therefore ϕ is
also an SNC of β on P . The proof that if ϕ is an SNC of β , then it is also an SNC of α is
symmetric.
The proof for WSC is similar. ✷
The following proposition makes precise the dual relation between strongest necessary
and weakest sufficient conditions:
Proposition 5. A formula ϕ is the strongest necessary (weakest sufficient) condition
of q iff ¬ϕ is the weakest sufficient (strongest necessary) condition of ¬q , where all the
conditions are on a common set of propositions and under a common theory.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is the SNC of q . Then T |= q ⊃ ϕ. Thus T |= ¬ϕ ⊃ ¬q . So ¬ϕ is a
SC of ¬q . Suppose ϕ′ is any other SC of ¬q : T |= ϕ′ ⊃ ¬q . Then T |= q ⊃ ¬ϕ′. Thus
T |= ϕ ⊃¬ϕ′. So T |= ϕ′ ⊃ ¬ϕ. This proves that ¬ϕ is the WSC of ¬q .
The proof of the other part of the proposition is similar. ✷
Proposition 6. If ϕ1, . . . , ϕk are the strongest necessary conditions of α1, . . . , αk ,
respectively, then ϕ = ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ϕk is the strongest necessary condition of α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αk ,
where all the conditions are on a common set of propositions and under a common theory.
Proof. First of all, ϕ is an NC: T |= α ⊃ ϕ. We show that it is the SNC using Theorem 1,
generalized to arbitrary formula using Proposition 3: we show that if M |= ϕ and M |= T ,
then there is a M ′ such that M ′ |= T , M ′ |= α, and M ′(P ) =M(P). Since M |= ϕ, there
must be an 1  i  k such that M |= ϕi . By Theorem 1 and Proposition 3, there is an M ′
such that M ′(P )=M(P), M ′ |= T , and M ′ |= αi , thus M ′ |= α. ✷
Symmetrically, for weakest sufficient conditions, we have:
Proposition 7. If ϕ1, . . . , ϕk are the weakest sufficient conditions of α1, . . . , αk , respec-
tively, then ϕ = ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕk is the weakest sufficient condition of α1 ∧ · · · ∧ αk , where all
the conditions are on a common set of propositions and under a common theory.
This proposition is particularly useful in planning when we do not have a successor state
axiom for every fluent: given a conjunctive goal g1 ∧ · · · ∧ gn, to achieve it using action
A, we need to compute the weakest sufficient condition of this conjunction, and reduce
the conjunctive goal to it. By this proposition, instead of having to compute the weakest
sufficient condition for every possible conjunction, it is enough to compute the condition
for each conjunct ahead of time.
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5. Computing strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions
There are several ways to compute these two conditions. We begin with prime
implicates [22]. As with most reasoning tasks, strongest necessary and weakest sufficient
conditions can be easily computed using prime implicates.
As it is customary in theorem proving, we shall equate a clause, which is a disjunction
of literals, with the set of disjuncts in it. Given a propositional theory T , a prime implicate
of T is then a clause C such that T |= C and there is no other clause C′ such that T |= C′,
C = C′, and C′ subsumes C, i.e., a subset of C.
Proposition 8. Let T be a theory, q a proposition, and P a set of propositions. Let Π be
the set of prime implicates of T that mention only propositions in P ∪ {q}.
(1) The strongest necessary condition of q on P under T is equivalent to the following
conjunction:∧
{C | ¬q ∨C ∈Π},
where if there is no such prime implicate in Π , then the conjunction is considered
to be true, and if ¬q ∈Π , then the conjunction is considered to be false.
(2) The weakest sufficient condition of q on P under T is equivalent to the following
disjunction:∨
{¬C | q ∨C ∈Π},
where if there is no such prime implicate in Π , then the disjunction is considered to
be false, and if q ∈Π , then the conjunction is considered to be true.
Proof. We prove this proposition for SNC. Let W be the conjunction in the proposition.
Clearly, T |= q ⊃W , so W is an NC. Now let ψ be any other NC: T |= q ⊃ψ , and Γ the
set of prime implicates of ψ . Since ψ does not mention q , the following set
Γ ′ = {¬q ∨C | C ∈ Γ }
is the set of prime implicates of q ⊃ ψ , where if C = true (i.e., ψ is a tautology), then
¬q ∨C is true, and if C = false (i.e., ψ is not satisfiable), then ¬q ∨C is ¬q . Now since
T |= q ⊃ ψ , for each ¬q ∨ C in Γ ′, T |= ¬q ∨ C, so there is a prime implicate ¬q ∨ C′
in Π such that C is subsumed by C′. Thus each prime implicate in Γ is subsumed by a
conjunct in W . So W |=ψ . ✷
However, computing the strongest necessary (similarly weakest sufficient) condition of
a proposition using prime implicates is almost always a bad idea, unless one wants these
conditions for all propositions on all possible sets of propositions and wants them in the
form of prime implicates. This is because, in general, there is no viable way of computing
the set Π in Proposition 8 short of computing the set of all prime implicates of a theory.
But once having the set of prime implicates, one can just “read” out these two conditions
for any proposition using Proposition 8.
Nevertheless, Proposition 8 is interesting in that it relates our notion of weakest
sufficient conditions to Reiter and de Kleer’s notion of minimal support clauses of a set
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of clauses [19]. According to Corollary 4 in [19], a clause C is a minimal support clause
for a proposition q with respect to T iff there is a prime implicate C′ of T such that q ∈ C′
and C = C′ − {q}. So from above proposition, for any theory T , and proposition q , if P
is the set of propositions that are in T but different than q , then the weakest sufficient
condition of a q on P under T is equivalent to the disjunction of the negation of each
minimal support clause for q with respect to T , and the strongest necessary condition of q
is equivalent to the conjunction of the minimal support clauses of ¬q .
However, our two conditions are defined independent of prime implicates. In fact, a
better way of computing them is in terms of the notion of forgetting that we defined in
Section 2, by using the following theorem: 2
Theorem 2. Let T be a theory, P a set of propositions, and q a proposition in T but not
in P . Let P ′ be the set of propositions that are in T but not in P ∪ {q}. Then we have:
(1) The strongest necessary condition of q on P is forget(T (q/true);P ′).
(2) The weakest sufficient condition of q on P is ¬forget(T (q/false);P ′).
Proof. We prove the case for SNC. The case for WSC is similar. First of all, forget(T (q/
true);P ′) is an NC: T |= forget(T ;P ′), so T |= q ⊃ forget(T ;P ′), thus T |= q ⊃
forget(T (q/true);P ′) because q /∈ P ′. It is the strongest: suppose α is an NC: α is
a formula of P , and T |= q ⊃ α. Thus, by Lemma 1, we have that forget(T ;P ′) |=
q ⊃ α, Therefore q |= forget(T ;P ′) ⊃ α. So q |= forget(T (q/true);P ′) ⊃ α. Thus |=
forget(T (q/true);P ′)⊃ α because q does not occur in forget(T (q/true);P ′)⊃ α. ✷
We illustrate the use of this theorem using the following theory
T = {q ⊃ p1 ∨ p2}.
According to the theorem, the strongest necessary condition of q on {p1,p2} is
forget(T (q/true); ∅), which is T (q/true) and equivalent to p1 ∨ p2, the same as given
in Example 1. The strongest necessary condition of q on {p1} is forget(T (q/true); {p2}),
which is equivalent to forget(p1 ∨ p2; {p2}), which by definition is (p1 ∨ true) ∨ (p1 ∨
false), thus equivalent to true.
By its definition, for any formula ϕ and propositionp, forget(ϕ;p) returns a formula that
is twice the size as that of ϕ; and for a set P of propositions, forget(ϕ;P) returns a formula
whose size is 2n times the size of ϕ, where n is the size of P . Indeed, computing forgetting
in the worst case is expensive. For instance, it is easy to see that a formula is satisfiable iff
forgetting all propositions in it returns true, and a formula is not satisfiable iff forgetting all
propositions in it returns false. However, forget(ϕ;p) can often be simplified. For instance,
if ϕ is in disjunctive normal form, then forget(ϕ;p) can be computed efficiently to yield a
formula that is shorter than ϕ: it is the result of replacing both p and ¬p in ϕ by true. More
generally, as Darwiche [5] showed, if ϕ is what he called decomposable negation normal
form, then forget(ϕ;p) can be computed efficiently.
2 Lang and Marquis [8] showed that a proposition q is definable on P under T iff T |= q ≡
forget(T (q/true);P ′). By Proposition 2, our theorem generalizes this result.
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In this paper, we consider two ways of computing forgetting: directly using its definition
or through (again) prime implicates. They are embodied below as Algorithms 1 and 2 for
computing strongest necessary conditions. The ones for weakest sufficient conditions are
similar.
Input. A set T of axioms, a set P of propositions, and a proposition q not in P .
Output. A formula of P that is the strongest necessary condition of q on P under T .
Algorithm 1.
(1) Let T1 = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ T is a sentence of P }, and T2 = T − T1. Replace q in T2 by true,
and transform the resulting theory into a minimal set of clauses C (see below for a
definition). Similarly, transform T1 into a minimal set of clauses C0.
(2) Let P ′ be the set of propositions in C but not in P .
(3) If P ′ is empty, then go to post-processing, otherwise select a proposition p in P ′,
and delete it from P ′.
(4) Transform C(p/true)∨C(p/false) into a minimal set of clauses, assign it to C, and
go back to step (3).
(5) Post-processing: although the resulting C is a strongest necessary condition of q , it
is often an unwieldy set of clauses; it can be simplified as follows:
• eliminate those clauses in C that are subsumed by one of the clauses in C0;
• for each clause α in C, transform (C−{α})∪C0 into a minimal set of clauses Cα ,
and eliminate α from C if it is subsumed by one of the clauses in Cα .
Where a minimal set of clauses is one such that:
• all unit clauses are resolved;
• none of the clauses is subsumed by any other clause in the set.
Our experience with this algorithm has been that it spends the bulk of the time on
computing minimal sets of clauses in step (4). But if we do not require a set of clauses
to be minimal, then the program quickly runs out of space.
Notice that according to our definition, for a set of clauses C to be a minimal one, only
unit clauses in it need to be resolved. So our notion of minimality is much weaker than
that of prime implicates. For comparison, let us consider computing forgetting using prime
implicates.
The following algorithm makes use of the fact that for any ϕ and P , forget(ϕ;P) is
equivalent to the conjunction of prime implicates of ϕ that do not mention any propositions
in P .
Algorithm 2.
(1) Let T1 = {ϕ | ϕ ∈ T is a sentence of P }, and T2 = T − T1. Transform T1 into a
minimal set of clauses C0.
(2) Generate the prime implicates of T2(q/true) using Tison’s procedure [22], and let C
be the set of those prime implicates that mention only propositions in P .
(3) Go to post-processing as in Algorithm 1.
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We have implemented the above two algorithms in SWI-Prolog, 3 and run them on both
random 3CNFs 4 and action theories used for computing successor state axioms in various
action domains [11]. It turned out that Algorithm 2 is always slower than Algorithm 1,
with on average a slow down of between 10 to 15 times. The reason is that computing
prime implicates is expensive. Our notion of minimal sets of clauses seems to serve our
purpose well here in cutting down the number and sizes of clauses without incurring too
much overhead in computing them.
Notice that in step (4) of Algorithm 1, after we have chosen a proposition to forget, we
compute immediately the result of forgetting this proposition, C(p/true)∨C(p/false), by
a set of minimal clauses. This is like breadth-first search, and as we have mentioned, is
the bottleneck of this algorithm. Alternatively, we could work on each disjunct separately,
and compute disjunctions only after all those propositions that need to be forgotten have
been eliminated. As it turned out, this variant of Algorithm 1 performed far better than
Algorithm 1 on random 3CNFs. For random 3CNFs with 50 variables and 215 clauses,
this variant of Algorithm 1 spent on average 15 minutes 5 to return a strongest necessary
condition of a proposition on a set of 10 other propositions, while Algorithm 1 did not
return a solution after running overnight. However, this variant of Algorithm 1 is about
20% slower on action theories. The key is with the disjunction C(p/true) ∨ C(p/false):
it can be simplified a lot for many benchmark action theories, but not much for random
theories.
Regardless of which approach one uses, we have found that sometimes, it is a lot easier
to compute the strongest necessary condition than the weakest sufficient condition, and
sometimes, it is the other way around. For instance, we have found that for many action
theories, strongest necessary conditions are a lot easier to compute than weakest sufficient
conditions. When one condition is much easier to compute, the following proposition will
be very useful in computing the other one.
Proposition 9. Let T be a theory, q a proposition, and P a set of propositions.
(1) If ϕ is a necessary condition of q on P under T , andψ a weakest sufficient condition
of q on P under T ∪ {ϕ}, then ϕ ∧ ψ is a weakest sufficient condition of q on P
under T .
(2) If ψ is a sufficient condition of q on P under T , and ϕ a strongest necessary
condition of q on P under T ∪ {¬ψ}, then ϕ ∨ψ is a strongest necessary condition
of q on P under T .
Proof.
(1) First of all, ϕ ∧ ψ is an SC: T ∪ {ϕ} |= ψ ⊃ q , so T |= ϕ ∧ ψ ⊃ q . It is the
weakest: suppose α is an SC: T |= α ⊃ q . We need to show that T |= α ⊃ ϕ ∧ ψ .
Since T |= q ⊃ ϕ. We have T |= α ⊃ ϕ. But α is also an SC of q under T ∪ {ϕ},
so T ∪ {ϕ} |= α ⊃ ψ because ψ is the WSC of q under T ∪ {ϕ}. Therefore
T |= α ⊃ (ϕ ∧ψ).
3 SWI-Prolog is developed by Jan Wielemaker at the University of Amsterdam.
4 Generated using a program by Kautz and Selman.
5 On a SPARC Ultra2 machine running SWI-Prolog.
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(2) Suppose ϕ′ is an NC of q under T : T |= q ⊃ ϕ′. From T |= ψ ⊃ q , we have
T |= ψ ⊃ ϕ′. From T ∪ {¬ψ} |= q ⊃ ϕ and T ∪ {¬ψ} |= q ⊃ ϕ′, we have
T ∪ {¬ψ} |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′. Thus T |= ¬ψ ∧ ϕ ⊃ ϕ′, this together with T |= ψ ⊃ ϕ′, we
have T |= ϕ ⊃ ϕ′. ✷
We illustrate this phenomenon next with a problem in reasoning about action.
6. Generating successor state axioms from causal theories
Consider a robot domain in which a robot needs to move objects around in an office
environment. To reason and plan in this domain, the robot needs to have a model of the
environment and the effects of her actions. For simplicity, let us assume that there is just
one object, and the action that the robot needs to reason about is move(1,2), meaning that
it moves from a certain location 1 to location 2. We can then represent the domain by the
following propositions:
• ati—initially, the object is at location i , for each location i .
• at1i—after the action move(1,2), the object is at location i .
• atRi—initially, the robot is at location i .
• atR1i—after the action, the robot is at location i .
• h—initially, the robot is holding the object.
• h1—after the action, the robot is holding the object.
One way of representing the effects of the action is to write a causal theory, which in this
case includes the following rules:
(1) The action will cause atR12 to be true, and for it to be possible, atR1 must be true;
(2) The object can be at only one location:
(ati ⊃ atj )∧ (at1i ⊃ at1j ),
for every pair of locations i = j ;
(3) The robot can be at only one location:
(atRi ⊃ atRj )∧ (atR1i ⊃ atR1j ),
for every pair of locations i = j ;
(4) If the robot is holding the object, then they are at the same location:[
h⊃ (ati ≡ atRi)
]∧ [h1 ⊃ (at1i ∧ atR1i )],
for every location i .
From these rules and a frame axiom which says that a property’s truth value will not be
changed unless entailed by the causal rules, we have the following set of axioms:
atR1 ∧ atR12,
atR1i ≡ atRi ∧¬
∨
j =i
atR1j ,
at1i ≡ [atR1i ∧ h1] ∨
[
ati ∧¬
∨
j =i
at1j
]
,
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h1 ≡ h,
atRi ⊃¬atRj , for any j = i,
ati ⊃¬atj , for any j = i,
where the disjunctions range over all locations. For instance, the third axioms says that the
package is at location i after that the robot has moved from location 1 to 2 (at1i ) is true
iff either the robot is at the same location (atR1i ) and holding it (h1) or the package was
initially at location i (ati ) and is not at any other location now. The first disjunct comes
from the fourth causal rule, and the second one by the frame axiom and the second causal
rule. The exact procedure of deriving these axioms from a causal theory and the rational
behind it are given in (Lin [10,11]).
With this set of axioms, one can determine for any proposition its truth value after the
robot has moved from location 1 to 2. However, for computational reasons, it is often
advantageous to compile the set of axioms into a set of successor state axioms (Reiter [18]).
In terms of situation calculus notation, a successor state axiom expresses the truth value of
a property in a successor situation in terms of the facts about the current situation, and has
the following format:
Poss(a, s)⊃ [F(do(a, s))≡Φ(s)],
where F(do(a, s)) stands for the truth value of a property F in the situation resulted from
doing a in the situation s, and Φ(s) is a formula about the situation s. Having these axioms
facilitates the computation of regression, a crucial mechanism used by most of the AI
planners.
In this example, what we want is to derive from the above set of axioms definitions of
propositions that are about the successor situations, for example at1i and atR1i , in terms
of propositions that are about the initial situation, for example, ati and atRi . This is where
our procedures for computing the strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions
come in, as by Proposition 2.
To illustrate, let q be at12, and P the set of propositions about the initial situation:
P = {h} ∪ {ati | i is a location} ∪ {atRi | i is a location}.
Then the weakest sufficient condition of q on P is the weakest condition about the initial
situation that would ensure that the package is at location 2 after the action is performed,
and the strongest necessary condition is the strongest conclusion that one can infer about
the initial situation once one knows that the package is at location 2 after the action is
performed. When the two conditions are equivalent, which turns out to be the case, we
have a successor state axiom for this property.
Fig. 1 compares the performance of computing the weakest sufficient condition of q
on P using Algorithm 1 with or without the aid of Proposition 9. In the figure, the x-axis
is the number of locations, and y-axis the CPU run time in seconds on a SPARC Ultra 2
machine with 128 MB of memory running SWI-Prolog (version 3.2.7). The line labeled by
snc corresponds to the strongest necessary condition of q on P , 6 the one labeled by wsc
the weakest sufficient condition of q on P , 7 and wsc1 the weakest sufficient condition of q
6 For which the program outputs h∨ at2 no matter how many locations there are in the domain.
7 For which the program always outputs h∨ at2. So we have the successor state axiom: at12 ≡ h∨ at2.
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Fig. 1. A robot domain.
on P once the strongest sufficient condition has been added to the theory 8 according to
Proposition 9. The speedup of wsc1 over wsc is quite obvious, and similar speedup was also
achieved for other propositions and other action domains that we have experimented with,
which include most of the benchmark planning domain in McDermott’s PDDL library [14].
7. Related work
Our notion of strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions bear structural
resemblance to Dijkstra’s notion of strongest postconditions and weakest preconditions
of programs (cf. [6]). However, Dijkstra was mainly concerned about compositional rules
of these conditions over program operators, once these conditions are given for basic
assignment statements. In contrast, our study of these two conditions are completely
general. Even in applications to computing the effects of actions, our concerns for these
two conditions differ from that of Dijkstra, and similarly recent applications of Dijkstra’s
notion to reasoning about action by Bjäreland and Karlsson [1], in that we are interested
in computing the effect of primitive actions from a set of direct effect axioms and causal
rules.
Our notion of weakest sufficient conditions is closely related to abduction and diagnosis.
In propositional logic, given a theory T , a query q , and a finite set A of propositions called
abducibles, an explanation is a finite set E of literals consisting of propositions in A such
that (see, e.g. [7,16,17,19,20]):
• T ∪E |= q and T ∪E is consistent.
• E is a minimal such set, i.e., there is no E′ that satisfies the above conditions and at
the same time is a proper subset of E.
8 For which the program always outputs true.
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As is well-known,E is an explanation of q with respect to T andA iff the clause consisting
of the complement of each element in E, i.e.,
∨
l∈E l˜ is a minimal support clause of q
with respect to T and A, where p˜ is ¬p and ¬˜p is p for any proposition p. 9 Thus by
Proposition 8, the weakest sufficient condition of q is logically equivalent to the disjunction
of all explanation of q . So much of the complexity results (e.g., [20]) for abduction carries
over here.
However, while much of the work on abduction and diagnosis has been on computing
individual explanations, we are more interested here in logical formulas that capture all
possible explanations without committing ourself to the exact formats that these formulas
ought to have. For instance, given the following T :
q ∨
∨
1in
(pi ∧ qi)
there are 2n number of explanations of q with respect to T and {pi, qi | 1  i  n}.
However, the disjunction of these explanations has a logically equivalent formula, i.e.,
a weakest sufficient condition of q , whose length is proportional to n: ¬∨1in(pi ∧ qi).
But there are some exceptions. In the framework of logic programming, Console et
al. ([3]) defined the explanation formula of an abduction problem to be the most specific
formula in the language of abducible atoms such that the formula is entailed by the Clark
completion of the program and the observation. Here the most specific formula is like our
strongest condition, but with a difference. According to Console et al., a formula ϕ is more
specific than ϕ′ if ϕ |= ϕ′, while for us, this entailment only needs to be true under the
given logical theory. This somewhat minor difference has some far reaching ramifications,
as we shall see in connection with a more recent work by Darwiche [4] who proposed a
very similar notion and applied it to diagnosis problems.
Given a theory T , a formula α, and a set of propositions P such that none of the
propositions in P occur in α, Darwiche [4] defined the consequence of α on P to be a
formula ϕ such that T ∪ {α} |= ϕ, and for any such ϕ′, we have that ϕ |= ϕ′. Similarly, he
defined the argument of α to be a formula ϕ such that T ∪ {ϕ} |= α, and for any such ϕ′,
we have that ϕ′ |= ϕ. As one can see, Darwiche’s notion of consequences generalizes that
of explanation formulas by Console et al. above, and his notion of arguments corresponds
to our notion of weakest sufficient conditions. But again, the crucial difference is in how
formulas are compared. In Darwiche’s case, as in the case of Console et al., when ϕ and ϕ′
are compared, they are compared to under logical entailment. But in our case, they are
compared to under logical entailment relative to the background theory T . The difference
has some significant ramifications. First of all, if T defines α: T |= α ≡ ϕ, then ϕ is both
the strongest necessary and weakest conditions of α. But ϕ may be neither the consequence
nor the argument of α according to Darwiche’s definitions. Secondly, the post-processing
step in Algorithm 1 will not be correct according to Darwiche’s definitions. Perhaps
most significantly, our Proposition 9 would not be true under Darwiche’s definitions. For
instance, consider the theory T = {p ⊃ q, q ⊃¬p}. According to Darwiche’s definitions,
the consequence of q on {p} with respect to T is ¬p. So for Proposition 9 to hold in
Darwiche’s framework, the argument of q on {p} with respect to T would have to be
9 This result is an easy corollary of the results in [19].
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equivalent to the conjunction of ¬p and the argument of q on {p} with respect to T ∪{¬p}.
Unfortunately, this is not true, as the conjunction is equivalent to false, which is not the
argument of q on {p} with respect to T . Notice that false is the weakest sufficient condition
of q on {p} under T , which means that under no condition on p can q be true as ¬p is
entailed by the theory. This last difference between our notion and Darwiche’s is significant
as Proposition 9 is the basis of one of the key strategies that we used for computing the
weakest sufficient conditions in relation to action theories.
8. Concluding remarks and future work
We have proposed a notion of strongest necessary and weakest sufficient conditions
of a proposition, and considered ways of computing them. We believe these conditions
have many potential applications in various areas including abduction and reasoning about
actions.
There are several directions for future work. One of them is to extend the results here
to the first-order case. This can be a difficult task. For instance, a result in [12] shows that
forgetting in the first-order case cannot in general be expressible in first-order logic. As a
consequence, we expect that strongest necessary conditions of a proposition under a first-
order theory cannot in general be expressible in first-order logic either. It seems that the
best hope for dealing with the first-order case is to first reduce it to the propositional case,
and then try to learn a first-order description from a set of propositional ones.
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